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Abstract
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most-able contestants? To what
extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abil-
ities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when
the proportion of high-ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases,
high-ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making
reverse sorting a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel
data set containing contest choice over twenty years. We use exogenous variation in
the participation of highly-able competitors to provide evidence for the relationship
among prizes, competition, and sorting.
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Competition is a defining feature of most economic and social environments. Contestants
of differing ability compete for valuable but limited resources by exerting effort. In many
cases, contestants choose from a variety of potential contests. For example, architects
choose design competitions; pharmaceutical companies select R&D contests; athletes pick
sports tournaments; and college graduates apply for positions in firms. In these settings,
contests typically differ in the way in which (relative) performance is rewarded.
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Rewarding contestants according to their relative performance is motivated by two
objectives: the provision of incentives to exert effort and the attraction of the most-able
participants. Lazear and Rosen (1981) were the first to consider rank-order tournaments
as a way to provide incentives. Since then, a large theoretical literature has been devel-
oped, determining the optimal design of such tournaments.1 A common theme in this
literature is that contestants exert greater efforts when prizes are larger and more concen-
trated towards the highest ranks.2 Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990), using data on golf
contests, and Eriksson (1999) and Bognanno (2001), studying labor tournaments, have
provided empirical evidence for these incentive effects.
While the relationship between prizes and effort seems to be well understood, com-
paratively little is known about their influence on contest selection.3 For other incentive
schemes, which use absolute rather than relative performance evaluation, selection effects
have been found to be as important as incentive effects. Lazear (2000) documents a
44-percent increase in productivity for a firm switching from salaries to piece rates and
attributes half of this increase to selection effects. High-ability workers find firms offering
piece rates more attractive than firms offering salaries. In the context of tournaments, it
remains an open question whether selection effects play a similarly important role.
Contest selection is complicated by its multidimensional and interdependent nature.
Contests may differ, not only in the size, but also the number of their prizes, making
prize-concentration and its effect on competition an important consideration for contest
choice. Moreover, a contestant’s set of opponents is endogenously determined through
his rivals’ participation decisions, creating the possibility of multiple equilibria. Existing
models of contest choice have either assumed that each contest awards a single prize (Leu-
ven et al. 2010) or that all contestants are homogeneous (Azmat and Mo¨ller 2009, Konrad
and Kovenock, 2012). In this paper, we relax both of these assumptions by proposing
a simple, illustrative model of contest selection with multiple prizes and heterogeneous
contestants, featuring a unique equilibrium. We show that the contests with the largest
prizes attract the highest number of talented contestants only when talent is relatively
scarce. In contrast, when talent exists in abundance, the contests with the least concen-
trated prize allocation become most attractive. To the best of our knowledge, our model
is the first to provide this tight link between the distributions of prizes and talent within
1For an extensive survey, see Konrad (2009).
2Exceptions to this rule exist when contestants are risk-averse (Krishna and Morgan, 1998) or effort
costs are sufficiently convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).
3A notable exception are models in which contest selection is independent of effort considerations
either because effort choices are absent (Damiano, Li, and Suen 2010, 2012) or because contests (and
hence effort costs) are approximately identical (Morgan, Sisak, and Va´rdy, 2015).
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and across contests.
In our setting, two types of contestants (high- and low-ability), choose between two
types of contests (high- and low-type). High-ability contestants have lower (constant)
marginal costs of effort than low-ability contestants. Contests differ in their prize struc-
ture. High-type contests are characterized by high prizes and high prize concentration,
whereas low-type contests are characterized by low-prizes and low-prize concentration.
More specifically, high-type contests offer a small number of large prizes, whereas low-
type contests offer a large number of small prizes. We show that the probability with
which a high-ability contestant participates in a high-type, rather than a low-type, con-
test is decreasing in the overall proportion of high-ability contestants. When high-ability
contestants become sufficiently numerous, sorting is reversed, that is, high-ability contes-
tants are more likely to enter low-type contests than high-type contests.
At first glance, the possibility of reverse sorting seems counterintuitive since, in this
case, contestants are attracted by contests with smaller prizes and stronger opponents.
The intuition is that low-type contests become more attractive since they mitigate compe-
tition by spreading out their prize budget. As a consequence, the contestants’ effort costs
are lower in low-type contests than in high-type contests. The interaction between effort
choices and contest selection underlines the importance of incorporating both elements
into models of tournament theory.
Empirically testing for selection effects is often difficult, if not impossible. In a labor-
market setting, for example, it is difficult to establish firm and worker types, and, quite
often, measuring individual performance is complicated or confounded by a number of
factors. It is also difficult to obtain information about the full range of workers’ outside
options, as well as their counterfactual earnings. Moreover, an exogenous shock to the
pool of talent, allowing for the study of its effects on sorting, rarely exists.
In this paper, we take advantage of an unusually clean opportunity to investigate the
extent of sorting across contests in a sports setting. Using extensive panel data, we ex-
amine the contest choices of professional marathon runners. Our setup contains all the
relevant ingredients needed to test the predictions of our model. Individual performance
is readily available, together with complete information on contest and runner charac-
teristics. This allows us to abstract from a number of identification problems present in
other types of data.
There are two important features that make marathons the ideal setting in which to
study contest choice. First, five Major marathons (Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, and
New York) have a special status comparable to the Grand Slam tournaments in tennis.
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They offer much higher prizes than other marathons and, on average, allocate a consid-
erably greater proportion of their prize money to the winner. This allows us to identify a
runner’s decision between competing in a Major or a Minor marathon, as a choice between
high-type and low-type contests. Second, highly-talented East-African runners, mainly
from Kenya and Ethiopia, dominate the sport of marathon running. This dominance is
striking and unparalleled in other sports. For example, according to the International
Association of Athletics Federations’ (IAAF) Top List, the 50 fastest male marathon run-
ners in 2012 were exclusively from Kenya or Ethiopia. This endows us with a proxy of
the contestants’ abilities (runners’ origin), which, unlike performance measures (finishing
times), is independent of effort and prize considerations. More importantly, it allows us
to use exogenous variation in local economic conditions to predict the participation of
high-ability runners (Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011).
We find that the likelihood that a high-ability runner will participate in a given
marathon is increasing in the race’s prize budget but decreasing in the expected number of
high-ability opponents. The participation of one additional high-ability opponent must be
compensated by a $2, 583 increase in the contest’s average prize to keep the race equally
attractive to high-ability runners. In line with our model, we find that the concentra-
tion of a race’s prize structure has a positive effect on participation when opposition is
expected to be weak, but has a negative effect when opposition is expected to be strong.
This is important since it establishes that selection and incentive effects are either aligned
or opposed, depending on the overall competitiveness of the environment.
Our paper uses a simple theoretical framework to illustrate that complete sorting
exists in tournaments only when the proportion of high-ability participants is sufficiently
small.4 Our empirical findings constitute first evidence for tournament selection effects
in a real setting.5 In line with our main theoretical result, we find that, when the overall
ability distribution shifts upwards, potential participants become more likely to avoid
competition. In particular, when the proportion of talented contestants increases by ten
percent, the likelihood with which any one of them participates in a Major rather than a
Minor race falls by around seven percent. These results suggest that, depending on the
ability distribution and prize structure, contestants avoid one another to the extent that
4From a theoretical perspective, assortative matching in the labor market has been extensively studied
in non-tournament settings (see, for example, Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011; Shimer and Smith, 2000).
5Sorting has been the focus of several recent empirical studies in settings such as the labor market
(Bagger and Lentz, 2012; Lise et al., 2016; Lopes de Melo, 2013) or school choice (Urquiola, 2005).
Experimental studies have also considered sorting across single-prize tournaments (Leuven et al., 2011)
and the choice between tournaments and alternative incentive schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson
et al., 2009).
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reverse sorting becomes a possibility.
Our results have the following implications for contest design: When contest choice
is endogenous, selection effects cannot be neglected, and the optimal prize allocation de-
pends crucially on the distribution of abilities among potential contestants. This holds
true, regardless of whether the objective is to maximize aggregate output or the winner’s
performance since prizes affect both the quality of the field and the incentives to exert ef-
fort. More importantly, selection effects can be diametrically opposed to incentive effects,
and the positive influence of concentrated prize allocations on efforts may be more than
compensated by their negative influence on the self-selection of talented contestants.
1 Theoretical Framework
We present a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the effect of changes in the ability
distribution on the level of sorting across contests. The model demonstrates that the pro-
vision of strong incentives increases participation of talented contestants, but that talent
crowds out talent. The model makes precise how these two factors interact, resulting,
first, in a negative relation between the frequency of high abilities and the level of sorting
and, second, in the possible existence of reverse sorting.
1.1 Model
We assume a continuum of contests and a continuum of risk-neutral players.6 Contests
allow for the same number N + 1 of participants. The integer N indicates a player’s
number of opponents. We let N ≥ 2 to guarantee that in each contest the number of
players is larger than the number of prizes. In order to balance the number of players
with the number of available contest slots, we assume that there exists a mass 1 of players
and a mass 1
N+1
of contests.
There are two types of contests, high-type contests and low-type contests. A contest of
type j ∈ {l, h} offers Mj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} prizes, identical in size, bj > 0.
7 High-type con-
6In such a setting, with many contests and a large number of players, a single player’s action has no
effect on the optimal contest choice of the remaining players. This rules out coordination issues, dominant
in settings with a small number of contests and players (Amegashie and Wu, 2004), and guarantees the
uniqueness of equilibrium. The implications of risk aversion are discussed at the end of the section.
7The assumption that, within a given contest, all prizes are identical makes the model tractable. A
general description of competition for the case of heterogeneous players and non-identical prizes is still
missing. Bulow and Levin (2006), Cohen and Sela (2008), Xiao (2016), and Olszewsky and Siegel (2016)
are first steps in this direction. We discuss the effect of skewed prize distributions on contest choice after
stating our main thoeretical result.
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tests award fewer (Mh < Ml) but larger (bh > bl) prizes than low-type contests.
8 In other
words, high-type contests are characterized by high prizes and high prize concentration,
whereas low-type contests are characterized by low-prizes and low-prize concentration.
Note that we do not make any restrictions with respect to the comparison of the contests’
overall prize budgets. However, for the purpose of the subsequent comparative statics
analysis, we define an increase in a prize structure’s concentration to be an increase in bj
accompanied by a decrease inMj , keeping the overall prize budgetMjbj unchanged. Apart
from the differences in their prize structures, high-type and low-type contests are assumed
to be identical. For simplicity, we assume that both types exist in equal proportions.9
There are two types of players, low-ability players and high-ability players, i ∈ {L,H}.
A high-ability player’s (constant) marginal cost of effort, cH > 0, is strictly smaller
than a low-ability player’s marginal cost, cL > cH . To abbreviate notation, we define
c ≡ cH
cL
∈ (0, 1). The crucial parameter of the model is the proportion of high-ability
players, denoted by y. We focus on the case in which high-ability players are in the
minority, y ∈ (0, 1
2
). This assumption guarantees that, if they desire, all high-ability
players can enter a high-type contest.
The model has two stages. In the first stage, players choose (simultaneously) which
(type of) contest to enter, and in the second stage, they compete by exerting effort
(simultaneously).10 At the entry stage, players form expectations about their opponents’
abilities based on their knowledge of the overall distribution of types and the equilibrium
strategies. At the competition stage, players observe their opponents’ abilities and, given
the contest’s prize structure, then simultaneously make their effort choices.11
We model competition as a perfectly discriminating contest, where prizes are awarded
to the players who exert the highest levels of effort (and ties are broken randomly).12 This
follows an extensive literature on contest design (see, for example, Clark and Riis (1998)
8This assumption makes contest choice non-trivial. If, instead, one type of contest offered fewer and
smaller prizes, then, neglecting potential differences in opposition, all contestants would prefer the other
type of contest. In a labor tournament setting, Yun (1997) shows that first-best efforts and efficient
self-selection can be achieved when workers are offered the choice between a tournament with many large
prizes and a tournament with few small prizes.
9We have verified that our results remain qualitatively unchanged when this assumption is relaxed.
The corresponding comparative statics are discussed at the end of this section.
10If players would choose contests sequentially and could observe who entered previously, they would
have an even stronger incentive to avoid contests with strong opponents. Hence, our assumption of
simultaneous entry is the most conservative with respect to the possibility of reverse sorting.
11Abstracting from effort choices and instead assuming that performance is determined by a player’s
ability plus noise would neglect the fact that low-type contests might be attractive due to their mitigating
effect on competition.
12Alternatively, competition could have a stochastic element–i.e., winning could depend on efforts and
random factors. For a discussion of this case, see footnote 16.
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and Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006)). In terms of payoffs, a player of type i who exerts
effort e ≥ 0 in a contest of type j will receive utility U ji = bj − cie if he wins one of the
Mj prizes, and U
j
i = −cie otherwise.
Since, at the competition stage, players can guarantee themselves a payoff of zero by
exerting no effort, and players are assumed to have a zero outside option, at the entry
stage, no player will choose not to participate in any contest at all.13 This means that if a
fraction qi ∈ [0, 1] of type i players enters high-type contests, then the remaining fraction
1−qi will enter low-type contests. The players’ behavior at the entry stage can, therefore,
be completely described by the fractions of low-ability (qL) and high-ability (qH) players
that enter high-type contests.14
The distribution of players across contests can be characterized as exhibiting: complete
sorting when all high-ability players enter high prize contests, qH = 1; partial sorting when
a larger number of high-ability players enter high-type contests than low-type contests,
qH >
1
2
; and reverse sorting when the opposite is the case, qH <
1
2
.
An equilibrium distribution of talent (qH , qL) has to satisfy two conditions: an opti-
mality condition and a feasibility condition. The optimality conditions requires that no
player must be able to increase his payoff by entering another (type of) contest. This
means that if players of the same type i enter both types of contests, qi ∈ (0, 1), then
these players must expect equal payoffs. In addition, if all players of type i enter the
same type of contest–i.e., qi ∈ {0, 1}–then their expected payoff must not be higher in the
other type of contest. The feasibility condition requires that the number of players who
participate in a given type of contest must equal the number of available slots in contests
of this type:
yqH + (1− y)qL = y(1− qH) + (1− y)(1− qL) =
1
2
. (1)
The novelty of the model outlined above is that it allows for the study of contest
selection in a setting with multiple prizes as well as heterogeneous contestants. While
heterogeneity is a pre-requisite for the study of sorting, allowing for multiple prizes is
important since the choice between a more competitive environment (with few prizes) and
13We assume that players participate when indifferent between participation and non-participation. We
show that low-ability players expect a zero payoff from participation since their expected prize winnings
are compensated exactly by their effort costs. A zero outside option, thus, means that, apart from prizes,
participation must offer alternative sources of utility that are independent of the choice of contest and
offset the potential benefits from non-participation. Adding a performance-independent payment (wage,
attendance pay) to the contests’ payoff structure has no effect on our results.
14Alternatively, qi can be interpreted as the probability with which a player of type i enters a high-type
contest. Since we consider a continuum of players, both interpretations are equivalent.
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a less competitive environment (with many prizes) constitutes one of the key dimensions
of the contest choice problem. In previous work, Azmat and Mo¨ller (2009) and Konrad
and Kovenock (2012) consider a group of homogeneous contestants choosing between
contests with differing prize structures. Due to the absence of ability differences, sorting
could not be analyzed in these models. In a setting with two single-prize contests of
varying size, Leuven et al. (2010) study sorting by allowing for two types of contestants.
They share our finding that reverse sorting is a possibility but reverse sorting arises for
a different reason and often in conjunction with positive sorting (multiple equilibria). In
their setting, reverse sorting can be an equilibrium only if by deviating to the low-prize
contest high-ability contestants would encounter a higher number of opponents. In our
setting reverse sorting arises even when contestants face the same number of opponents in
each contest and is due to the mitigating effect of low prize concentrations on competition.
Our analysis proceeds by backward induction and consists of two steps. In Section
1.2, drawing on a recent result by Siegel (2009), we characterize a player’s expected payoff
from participating in a contest with a given set of opponents. The main result necessary
for the subsequent analysis, which is the focus of our study, is that a player’s expected
payoff is positive (and equal to bj(1 − c)) if and only if the player has high ability and
the number of high-ability opponents is strictly smaller than the number of prizes Mj.
In Section 1.3, we use these payoffs to derive our main theoretical results on the players’
individual contest choice and the equilibrium distribution of talent across contests. All
proofs are given in the Appendix.
1.2 Competition
In this section, we derive a player’s expected payoff at the competition stage–that is, for a
given set of prizes and opponents. In making their effort choice, players trade off a higher
chance of winning against an increase in their costs of effort. The characterization of
equilibrium effort strategies has proven difficult in general, even for the case in which all
prizes are identical (Baye et al. (1996), Clark and Riis (1998), and Barut and Kovenock
(1998)). Players use mixed strategies due to the all–pay auction character of competition.
Because of the potential presence of identical players, multiple equilibria may exist. These
equilibria differ with respect to the set of players who are active–that is, who provide
effort with positive probability. In equilibrium, all active players win a prize with positive
probability. More-able players are more likely to win a prize since they exert higher efforts
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Siegel (2009) shows that for a large class of “generic contests,”all equilibria are payoff-
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equivalent. More specifically, the players’ expected payoffs depend on their abilities and
the contest’s prize structure, but not on the particular equilibrium that is played. In
our setting, a contest with Mj prizes is generic if the player with the Mj + 1’s lowest
marginal cost of effort has marginal costs that are different from any other player’s. In
what follows, we use a perturbation argument that allows us to employ Siegel’s results.
For this purpose, suppose that there exist arbitrarily small differences in the marginal
costs of effort for players of the same type i ∈ {L,H}.15 Under this additional assumption,
the main result of Siegel (2009) implies that, in a contest with Mj prizes, a player’s
expected payoff, in any equilibrium, is given by max(0, bj(1 − γ)), where γ denotes the
ratio of the player’s marginal cost over the Mj + 1’s lowest marginal cost of all players in
the contest. Therefore, by taking the limit, we get the following:
Lemma 1 Suppose that NH ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N +1} high-ability players and N +1−NH low-
ability players participate in a contest offering Mj prizes of size bj. A player’s expected
payoff is bj(1− c) if the player has high ability, and the number of high-ability opponents
is strictly smaller than the number of prizes. Otherwise, his payoff is zero.
Note that for low-ability players, (expected) prize winnings are exactly offset by the (ex-
pected) costs of effort.16 High-ability players enjoy a comparative advantage due to their
lower marginal cost of effort and, therefore, obtain a positive payoff. This comparative
advantage disappears when the number of high-ability players, NH , exceeds the number
of prizes, Mj . In this case, all players expect a zero payoff, independent of their ability.
1.3 Contest Choice
In this section, we first consider how a player’s preferences over contests depend on the
contests’ prize structure and the expected opposition. In a second step, we determine the
equilibrium allocation of talent across contests.
1.3.1 Individual preferences
The analysis in the previous section showed that low-ability players expect the same
(zero) payoff, independent of the type of contest they enter. Hence, low-ability players
15The argument is made precise in the proof of Lemma 1 contained in the Appendix.
16 This is a consequence of contests being perfectly discriminating. If contests involved a random
element, then the expected payoffs of low-ability players would depend on prizes, but this dependence
would still be weaker than it is for high-ability players. Since sorting can be expected to be strongest
when ability matters most, the absence of randomness is the most conservative assumption with respect
to our finding that sorting may be reversed. For a detailed study of the relationship between a contest’s
prize structure and its randomness, see Azmat and Mo¨ller (2009).
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are indifferent between the two types of contests, and we can concentrate our analysis
on the preferences of high-ability players. The expected payoff of a high-ability player
does depend on the specific features of the contest he enters. In the preceding section, we
demonstrated that in a contest offering Mj prizes of size bj , a high-ability player expects
a positive payoff equal to bj(1− c) if the number of high-ability opponents is smaller than
Mj and a zero payoff otherwise.
At the time of entry, the number of high-ability opponents in a particular type of
contest is uncertain. Hence, from the viewpoint of the entry stage, the player’s preferences
will depend on the likelihood pj with which an opponent has high ability. According to
Lemma 1, the probability with which a high-ability player obtains a positive payoff is
identical to the probability with which at mostMj−1 of hisN opponents have high-ability.
It is given by F (Mj − 1;N, pj) with F denoting the cumulative binomial distribution
function
F (K;N, p) ≡
K∑
k=0
f(k;N, p) ≡
K∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k (2)
measuring the likelihood of observing at most K “successes” within N independent bi-
nomial draws with success-probability p. A high-ability player’s expected payoff from
entering the contest is
E[UH ] = bj(1− c)F (Mj − 1;N, pj). (3)
It depends on the contest’s prize structure, represented by Mj and bj , and the expected
opposition, given by the likelihood pj of meeting high- rather than low-ability opponents.
Note that, at this stage, the variable pj is treated as exogenous. The determination of its
equilibrium value follows below. In the Appendix, we prove the following result:
Proposition 1 A high-ability player’s expected payoff from entering a contest is increas-
ing in the size bj of its prizes but decreasing in the probability pj with which opponents have
high ability. Payoffs are increasing in the concentration of the contest’s prize structure
when opposition is weak (pj < p¯j) but decreasing when opposition is strong (pj > p¯j).
The first part of Proposition 1 is intuitive and follows easily from (2) and (3). The
last part of Proposition 1 considers the effect of a decrease in the number of prizes,
accompanied by an increase in the size of the prize. As can be seen from the proof
contained in the Appendix, the particular value taken by the threshold p¯j depends on the
specific changes in Mj and bj . Intuitively, when the probability of meeting high-ability
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opponents is small, high-ability players prefer a more concentrated prize structure due to
their comparative advantage over low-ability players. In contrast, when the probability
of meeting high-ability opponents is large, high-ability players prefer a less concentrated
prize structure due to its mitigating effect on competition and the resulting decrease in
effort costs.
To summarize, while prizes are predicted to have a positive effect on a player’s decision
to enter a particular contest, the effect of (expected) opposition is negative. Moreover,
opposition has not only a level effect, but also an interactive effect with the concentration
of the contest’s prize structure.
1.3.2 Sorting
Having described the players’ individual preferences, we now determine their equilibrium
allocation across the two types of contests. Our analysis proceeds as follows. For a given
allocation (qH , qL), we determine the likelihood pj of meeting high-ability opponents in a
contest of type j ∈ {l, h}, which allows us to calculate the players’ expected payoffs in
both types of contest. We then verify whether the optimality and feasibility conditions
outlined above are satisfied. The indifference of low-ability players implies that optimality
needs to be checked only for high-ability players and that feasibility is guaranteed by the
low-ability players’ willingness to fill any slot that has remained idle.
For a given allocation (qH , qL), the number of high-ability players who choose a high-
type contest is given by yqH . Since there are
1
N+1
contests, and both types of contests exist
in equal proportion, there are 1
2(N+1)
high-type contests, each offering N + 1 slots. The
likelihood with which a slot in a high-type contest is filled with a high-ability opponent
can be calculated by dividing the number of high-ability players who choose a high-type
contest, yqH , by the overall number of slots available in the high-type contests,
1
2
. It is
given by ph = 2yqH . Similarly, the likelihood with which a slot in a low-type contest is
filled by a high-ability opponent is given by pl = 2y(1− qH).
To check optimality for high-ability players, we need to consider the difference between
their expected payoffs from entering a high-type versus a low-type contest. From (3) this
difference is proportional to
∆ ≡ bhF (Mh − 1;N, ph)− blF (Ml − 1;N, pl). (4)
High-ability players strictly prefer a high-type (low-type) contest when ∆ > 0 (∆ < 0)
and are indifferent when ∆ = 0. In the Appendix, we prove the following result:
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Proposition 2 There exists a unique equilibrium allocation (q∗H , q
∗
L) of abilities that de-
pends on the proportion y of high abilities in the population of players. In particular, there
exist critical values y¯ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and y¯ ∈ (y¯, 1
2
] such that the following hold:
1. For y ≤ y¯, sorting is complete, q∗H = 1. All high-ability players enter high-type
contests.
2. For y¯ < y < y¯, sorting is only partial, q∗H ∈ (
1
2
, 1). High-type contests attract
a greater number of high-ability players than low-type contests. Moreover, talent
crowds out talent–i.e., q∗H is strictly decreasing in y.
3. For y¯ ≤ y, sorting is reversed, q∗H ≤
1
2
. Low-type contests attract a greater number
of high-ability players than high-type contests.
An increase in the high-type contests’ prize budget Mhbh relative to the low-type con-
tests’ prize budget Mlbl leads to a higher level of sorting by increasing q
∗
H and y¯.
The intuition for this result is as follows. High-type contests offer high prizes, while
low-type contests mitigate competition by spreading out their prize budget. From the
viewpoint of a high-ability player, effort considerations become more important as the
likelihood of meeting high-ability rivals increases, and his comparative advantage over
low-ability players plays a smaller role. When high abilities become sufficiently frequent,
the mitigation of competition outweighs all else, such that high-ability players prefer
low-type contests over high-type contests, even though prizes are smaller and rivals are
more able in the former than in the latter. This contrasts with the common intuition
that, in equilibrium, contest choices should be driven by a trade-off between high prizes
and strong opposition, versus low-prizes and weak opposition. The possibility of reverse
sorting, therefore, emphasizes the need for including effort considerations in models of
contest choice.
For the general case, we cannot rule out that y¯ = 1
2
. To show that within our range
of parameters y ∈ (0, 1
2
), reverse sorting is indeed a possibility, we provide an example in
which y¯ is strictly smaller than 1
2
.
Example: Reverse sorting between one-prize and two-prize contests. Consider the special
case in which both types of contests have the same total prize budget B. Let high-type
contests award their entire budget to the player with the highest effort–i.e., Mh = 1 and
bh = B. Let low-type contests offer two identical prizes instead–i.e., Ml = 2 and bl =
B
2
.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show for the general case that ∆ is strictly decreasing in
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qH . This is intuitive since an increase in qH raises the expected opposition in a high-type
contest while lowering the expected opposition in a low-type contest. Hence, y¯ < 1
2
if
and only if ∆(qH =
1
2
) < 0 for some y < 1
2
. For the special case under consideration,
substitution of Mj and bj into (4) leads to
∆(q =
1
2
) =
B
2
(1− y)N−1(1− (N + 1)y). (5)
This shows that reverse sorting between one-prize and two-prize contests of identical
budgets exists when y > 1
N+1
. For example, when contests allow for 20 participants,
then sorting would already be reversed when more than five percent of the players in the
population of potential participants have high-ability.
We expect that our results will hold quite generally. In our model, the main driver
of the results is that low prize concentration mitigates competition, leading to a reduc-
tion in effort costs. This element of the model is not unique to our setting. Indeed, it
has been established that low prize concentration (in form of multiple rather than single
prizes) can lead to an increase in (aggregate) efforts only in exceptional cases, for exam-
ple, when effort costs are sufficiently convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), or when the
number of contestants is small and contestants are sufficiently risk averse (Krishna and
Morgan, 1998) or heterogeneous (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). It is therefore likely that
Proposition 2 will hold in alternative contest setups.
Proposition 2 is also robust with respect to other features of our setup. First, it
remains valid when players are risk averse rather than risk neutral. To see this, note that
from the viewpoint of a high-ability player, each contest can be understood as a lottery
with two possible outcomes. A high payoff is obtained when the number of high-ability
participants fails to exceed the number of prizes, and a low payoff is obtained otherwise.
For qH >
1
2
, the high payoff, though smaller, is more likely to be obtained in low-type
contests than in high-type contests. Hence, low-type contests constitute the less-risky
lottery. Risk aversion gives high-ability players an additional incentive to choose a low-
type rather than a high-type contest.17 Therefore, we consider our assumption of risk
neutrality as the most conservative with respect to the possibility of reverse sorting.18
Second, consider the effect of relaxing our assumption that both types of contests exist
in equal proportions. Suppose, for example, that there exists a larger number of high-type
17This is in line with Dohmen and Falk’s (2011) experimental finding that subjects who choose a
tournament rather than a fixed payment have a lower degree of risk aversion.
18Note that this discussion ignores that risk aversion may also influence the way in which players
compete. It has been shown, for example, that risk aversion decreases the effort of low-ability contestants
but increases the effort of high-ability contestants in single-prize contests (Fibich et al., 2006).
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than low-type contests. In this case, the likelihood of meeting a high-ability opponent
in a high-type contest is lower than 2yqH , and the likelihood of meeting a high-ability
player in a low-type contest is higher than 2y(1 − qH), for any given value of qH . This
makes high-type contests more attractive relative to low-type contests, leading to a (weak)
upward shift in the equilibrium value of q∗H . The thresholds y¯ and y¯ shift to the right.
The results in Proposition 2 change quantitatively but remain qualitatively unchanged.
Finally, suppose that contests offer decreasing rather than identical prizes. If high-
type contests offer a steeper prize allocation than low-type contests then contest-types
differ in the same way as before, although differences are less pronounced. In particular,
contests with steeper prize allocations offer higher prizes to top-performers while contests
with flatter prize allocations can be expected to mitigate competition.19 We therefore
believe that our results would extend to settings with heterogeneous prizes.
1.3.3 Coordination
Our model can be used to shed light on the influence of coordination on the allocation of
talent across contests. For this purpose, assume that, rather than being non-cooperative,
the contest choice of all high-ability contestants is the task of a common coordinator.20
The coordinator influences the allocation of high-ability contestants by choosing the frac-
tion qH ∈ [0, 1] entering high-type contests.
21 The coordinator’s objective is to maximize
the sum of all high-ability contestants’ (expected) payoffs:
E
[∑
UH
]
= (1− c) [qHbhF (Mh − 1;N, ph) + (1− qH)blF (Ml − 1;N, pl)] . (6)
The coordinated solution qCH must satisfy the first order condition
∆C = ∆+ 2y(1− c)
[
qHbh
∂F (Mh − 1;N, ph)
∂p
− (1− qH)bl
∂F (Ml − 1;N, pl)
∂p
]
≥ 0. (7)
Here ∆ denotes the term defined in (4), determining the non-cooperative equilibrium q∗H .
The term in square brackets measures the externalities of a high-ability contestant’s con-
test choice on all other high-ability contestants. Since F is decreasing in p, a contestant’s
19Although this seems reasonable, confirming it would require a model of competition with heteroge-
neous players and heterogeneous prizes.
20Assuming full coordination allows us to consider sorting in a setting which is diametrically opposed
to our benchmark case of non-cooperative contest choice. We expect all partially coordinated outcomes
to lie in between these two polar cases.
21While contest-type choices are coordinated, we continue to assume that, within each type, contests
are picked randomly and, once contestants have entered a certain contest, they choose their efforts non-
cooperatively.
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switch from low-type to high-type contests, decreases the payoff of the qH contestants
in high-type contests by (1 − c)bh while increasing the payoff of the 1 − qH contestants
in low-type contests by (1 − c)bl. The difference between the coordinated and the non-
cooperative solution is that the coordinator internalizes these externalities whereas they
are neglected when contestants choose individually.
The internalization of contest-choice externalities may prevent the coordinator’s ob-
jective function from being concave, thereby complicating the characterization of the
coordinated solution qCH along the lines of Proposition 2. However, the coordinator’s ob-
jective is, in fact, concave when the number of high-ability contestants is sufficiently low,
which is when coordination is most likely to play a role. This allows us to obtain the
following:
Proposition 3 Suppose that y < Mh
2N
. If (non-cooperative) sorting is positive, coordina-
tion decreases the fraction of high-talent players participating in high-type contests, i.e.
q∗H ≥
1
2
⇒ qCH ≤ q
∗
H with strict inequality for q
∗
H < 1.
Proposition 3 shows that the coordinated solution qCH serves as a lower bound for the non-
cooperative equilibrium q∗H .
22 This is intuitive since, due to the externalities described
above, the coordinator has an incentive to spread high-ability players across contests.
Moreover, even with coordination, the two major forces -high prizes versus low effort
costs- determining contest choice in the non-cooperative setting are still present. We
therefore expect the coordinated solution to share the properties of the non-cooperative
equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2. In particular, the negative dependence of sorting
on the number of high-ability contestants should continue to exist in the presence of
coordination.23
2 Empirical Framework
Our theoretical framework makes precise how a contest’s attractiveness to high-ability
runners depends on its prize structure and how the overall number of high-ability run-
ners influences their sorting across the two types of contests. Thus, testing the model’s
predictions requires variation in the distribution of abilities and variation in prize struc-
tures across contests. In this section, we test our model’s predictions using a large panel
22Since q∗H < 1 ⇔ bhF (Mh − 1, 2y¯) < bl (see proof of Proposition 2), we can always choose
bl
bh
such
that y¯ < Mh
2N
, i.e. there indeed exist parameters for which qCH is strictly smaller than q
∗
H .
23We have confirmed this numerically. Details are available on request.
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dataset of international city marathons and professional marathon runners, which spans
more than 20 years.24
Beyond the common advantages of sports data recognized in the literature, two im-
portant factors make marathons the ideal setting to test our theory.25 First, a fairly
homogeneous group of high-ability runners can be identified by their (East-African) ori-
gin rather than by performance measures–such as finishing time–that may be endogenous
to the prize budget. Second, there are five races (Boston, Berlin, Chicago, London, and
New York), which, for historical reasons, have a special status in running, comparable
to the “Grand-Slam” tournaments in tennis. These races offer considerably higher and
more-concentrated prizes than others.
The dominance of East-African marathon runners is most striking. In 2009, for exam-
ple, 88 of the 100 fastest (male) marathon runners were from either Kenya or Ethiopia.26
This dominance, unparalleled in other sports, has been explained by genetic, social, nu-
tritional, and geographical factors (Finn, 2012). It allows us to overcome the usual iden-
tification problem of measuring ability using past performance, which, unlike origin, may
depend on prize and effort considerations. Another advantage is that this group of high-
ability runners is fairly homogeneous, as postulated by our model, and exhibits a good
deal of variation in marathon participation, thereby enabling our analysis of sorting. The
dominance of East-African runners became apparent in the 1970s, when a handful of East-
African runners participated in international marathons, winning by great margins. Their
success sparked a professional running culture in their home countries making marathon
running a way to escape poverty. Certain minimum standards, however, must be met to
make travel abroad worthwhile and, as a consequence, the participation of East- Africans
in international races is still restricted to the most-talented.27 Marathon running, in gen-
eral, has become more competitive (see Figure 1). While in the early 1980s, the fastest
runners had a comparative advantage of around six percent (eight minutes), this advan-
tage had decreased to less than two percent (two minutes) by the late 2000s. This change
24We are not the first to use sports data to test the predictions of contest theory, although this literature
has focused mainly on incentive effects; see Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Brown (2011) on golf;
Becker and Huselid (1992) on auto racing; and Lynch and Zax (2000) on running.
25Sports contests share many features with other contests, such as those seen in a labor-market setting.
However, unlike in labor tournaments, prizes and performance are easily observed. It is often difficult,
if not impossible, to know the pay structure within firms. Moreover, workers’ individual performance is
seldom observed; nor are there well-defined measures that are recognized across firms, even for those in
the same industry or sector.
26See Top List of the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) available online at
http://www.iaaf.org/statisitics/toplist/index.html.
27As a robustness check, we compare performance in years with a greater presence of East-African
runners to years in which there are fewer. The quality of performance is not affected. See Section 2.4.
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in the ability distribution constitutes a crucial element of our analysis of sorting.
Regarding contests, our model postulates the existence of two types that differ with
respect to their prize structure. In the world of running, a clear distinction can be made
between the races in Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, and New York and the remaining
races. These five marathons have the longest history and attract the highest number of
runners. Their special status has manifested itself in the creation of the World Marathon
Majors series in 2006.28 In the following we will therefore refer to these races as “Major”
marathons and denote all remaining races as “Minor” marathons. Most importantly,
the Major marathons award much higher prizes and offer considerably more-concentrated
prize allocations than other marathons. These features allows us to identify the World
Marathon Majors as the high-type contests of our theoretical model.
Apart from the dominance of East-African runners and the special status of the Major
marathons, a number of other features of professional marathons make them an appro-
priate setting for testing the theoretical model. First, the model assumes that players
can participate in, at most, one contest. This is consistent with the empirical framework.
Marathons are typically clustered into two seasons: spring and autumn. Marathon run-
ners can run more than one race, but to achieve top performance they must allow for a
considerable rest period between races. As a consequence, runners typically choose only
one race per season.29
Second, the model assumes that runners make their race choices simultaneously. In
fact, what matters for the analysis is not the precise timing of entry, but that runners
face uncertainty regarding the race choice of other runners at the time of their own entry
decision. An important feature of marathon running is that runners must choose their
races several months in advance in order to achieve peak performance on race day via the
exact adjustment of their training plans. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that runners
face considerable uncertainty about their prospective opponents when making their race
choices.
Third, in the model, players are assumed to be motivated only by prize money. To
empirically judge the importance of other factors, such as prestige or the possibility of
achieving a personal best, we perform a counterfactual analysis in Section 2.4. In this
analysis, we show that, conditional on their effort and that of all other runners, runners
most often enter the race in which they maximize their monetary payoff, providing support
28Collectively, the group annually attracts more than five million on-course specta-
tors, 250 million television viewers, and 150,000 participants. For more details, see
http://worldmarathonmajors.com/US/about/.
29In our sample, less than two percent of runners run more than two races per year.
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for the model’s focus on prizes. In this respect, it is also important to note that in
comparison to other sports, very few runners obtain the status of a marketable superstar,
so prize money consititutes the dominant source of income for most runners.
Finally, our restriction to two types of contests with few (identical) high prizes or many
(identical) low-prizes is certainly a simplification with respect to the more sophisticated
prize structures used in marathons. Nevertheless, it provides a good approximation of
the runners’ main trade-off between a small likelihood of winning a high prize and a large
likelihood of winning a low prize.
2.1 Data Description
We use data from the Association of Road Racing Statisticians, which contains detailed
race and runner information for the largest international marathons. We restrict attention
to the 35 marathons that are present in our sample for the entire period from 1986 to
2009.30 Since a marathon’s prize budget and participation are strongly correlated with
the number of years that the race has been in existence, these races are among the most
important events in the world of road racing.
For each race, we observe the date, location, and the prize distribution. At the runner
level, we identify the top (professional) finishers for each race. To maintain a balanced
panel and since we are only interested in the race choice of the most-able runners, we
restrict our attention to the first 20 finishers in each race (separately by gender). Since
marathons award fewer than twenty prizes for each race, our data contain runners who
win and runners who do not win a prize. We have information on the runners’ gender,
nationality, date of birth, finishing time, finishing position, and the prize awarded (if
any).31 Tables 1 and 2 provide the main descriptive statistics for races and runners,
respectively.
In Table 1, we show the descriptive statistics separately for Major and Minor races.
Table 1 shows that the average prize in a Major marathon is considerably higher than
the average prize in a Minor marathon ($17,227 compared to $3,240). Moreover, we see
30These are: Beijing, Berlin, Boston, California International, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Dublin, Frank-
furt, Gold Coast, Grandma’s, Hamburg, Honolulu, Houston, Italia, Kosice, London, Los Angeles, Madrid,
New York, Ottawa, Paris, Reims, Richmond, San Antonio, Rome, Seoul, Stockholm, Tokyo, Turin, Twin
Cities, Valencia, Venice, Vienna, and Warsaw. We exclude the marathons in Rotterdam, Amsterdam,
and Fukuoka since no prize-money information was available. We also exclude Dubai because it has
existed only a few years.
31Some marathons have faster (flatter) race courses than others, but the Association of Road Rac-
ing Statisticians has constructed conversion factors to make marathons comparable. We adjust all the
finishing times in our dataset using these conversion factors.
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that Major marathons award a considerably greater share of their prize budget to the
winner than Minor marathons (34 percent compared to 27 percent). A comparison of the
Herfindahl concentration index based on the first three prizes reveals that 57 percent of
the Major races have a Herfindahl index greater than the average, compared to only 35
percent for Minor races. Hence, in line with our theoretical framework, Major marathons
offer higher but more-concentrated prize structures. Further support for the identification
of Major races as high-type contests is provided in Section 2.4.
Apart from prizes, there are other stark differences between the two race categories.
Major marathons have (overall) around three times more participants thanMinor marathons
(22,332 compared with 6,838). The two types of races also differ in the quality of the run-
ners they attract. From Table 1, we can see that, on average, over all years, the fraction of
high-ability runners has been considerably larger in the Major races. This holds whether
we identify high-ability runners by origin or by (course-adjusted) finishing times. For
example, 18 percent of the finishers in the Major races were East-African, compared to
only 14 percent in the other races. Similarly, 29 percent of runners in the Major races had
a finishing time within five percent of the year’s best, compared with only eight percent
in the Minor races. As a consequence, winning times in Major races are, on average, eight
minutes faster, which is equivalent to a 2.6km lead.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of runners. In this table, we compare East-
African runners, high-ability Non-East-African runners, and other Non-East-African run-
ners, respectively. High-ability Non-East-African runners are defined as the 100 fastest
Non-East-African runners within their gender category, based on their fastest finishing
time for a given year.32 For male runners, we see that East-African runners are com-
parable to high-ability Non-East-African runners on a number of dimensions, including
prize money ($7,676 versus $8,284), finishing times (two hours, 14 minutes versus two
hours, 12 minutes), and the number of marathons entered in a given year (1.42 versus
1.44). Compared with other runners, however, these two groups look very different. For
female runners, the same patterns hold. East-African runners are comparable with the
best Non-East-Africans, lending support to our identification of East-African runners as
high-ability contestants; but both groups are noticeably different from other runners. The
focus of the analysis will be on these high-ability runners.
32Our results are robust with respect to changes in the cut-off point for our definition of “high-ability.”
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2.2 Individual Contest Choice
We are now ready to test the predictions of our model. We start by considering a run-
ner’s individual race choice before moving to the equilibrium allocation of talent in the
subsequent section.
To test Proposition 1, we investigate how a runner’s expected payoff from a marathon
and, hence, his probability of entering depend on the race’s characteristics. Letting Pijt
denote the probability with which runner i enters race j in time period t, we estimate the
following equation:
Pijt = α0 + αAAjt−1 + αBBjt + αCCjt + αAC(Ajt−1 ∗ Cjt) +Xiβ + εijt. (8)
The variable Ajt−1 denotes the level of expected opposition. It is measured as the pro-
portion of high-ability participants among the race’s top 20 finishers in the previous year.
The variable Bjt denotes the marathon’s average prize. Cjt is a measure of the prize struc-
ture’s concentration, calculated as the ratio of the first prize over the sum of all prizes.
We also include a vector of control variables, Xi, containing the runner’s age, nationality,
gender, and ranking in the previous year. In addition, we control for whether the race
took place on the runner’s home turf since that may confer some comparative advantage.
We also control for gender-specific time dummies and race fixed-effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the runner-year level.
According to Proposition 1, the probability with which a runner enters a race will
be increasing in the average prize, Bjt, such that αB > 0, and decreasing in expected
opposition, Ajt−1, such that αA < 0. Moreover, we expect the effect of concentration, Cjt,
on entry to depend on the level of expected opposition. The model predicts that more-
concentrated prize structures are attractive only when there are sufficiently few opponents,
and are unattractive otherwise. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on the interaction
term (Ajt−1 ∗ Cjt) to be negative (αAC < 0). Since Proposition 1 is concerned with the
preferences of high-ability contestants, we restrict our attention to the race choice of the
top runners.
As our main variable of interest (Ajt−1), is based on the past race choices made by
a group of top-runners, using the race choice observations for runners from the same
group would result in a mechanical bias. This is because their races choices would be
influenced by the races’ characteristics in an identical way. We would therefore want to
separate runners into two groups with identical (high) ability but (potentially) different
race choice preferences. We do this by restricting the participation analysis to the high-
ability Non-East-African runners and by using the proportion of East-African runners in
20
a race’s previous edition as proxy for the expected opposition. We showed in Table 2 that
both groups of runners are comparable in their abilities. However, it is likely that there
exists enough independent variation in their race choices to give a causal estimation of the
effect of expected opposition on race participation. Another advantage of using runners
from East-Africa is that it allows us to use exogeneous variation in local conditions as an
instrument for expected opposition.33 We will deal with this issue explicitly in the next
section.
In Table 3, we present the results without the interaction between opposition and
concentration. Columns 1 and 2 present the baseline regression without and with con-
trols, respectively. Column 3 includes year dummies and year dummies interacted by
gender to control for the changing trends in the participation of (East-African) runners
in marathons. Column 4 includes race fixed-effects, which allows for race-specific features
that are attractive or unattractive to runners. Races tend to take place in the same month
each year. We also control for this, as a means to account for seasonal effects. Overall, we
find that an increase in expected opposition is associated with a decrease in the entry of a
high-ability contestant in a race, and the average prize has a positive effect on entry. The
results allow us to determine the “prize” that contestants are willing to pay for a reduc-
tion in opposition. We find that a high-ability runner’s likelihood of participation is kept
unchanged if a reduction in the (expected) number of opponents by one is accompanied
by a decrease in the race’s average prize by $2, 583.34 This constitutes almost 50 percent
of a race’s average prize, calculated over all races. With respect to prize concentration,
overall, prize concentration has a positive effect on participation once we control for time
and race fixed-effects.
Table 4 shows that the results are robust to alternative definitions of high-ability and
expected opposition. First, we extend our definition of high-ability Non-East-African
runners to include those who finish in the Top 100 during any of the last three years
rather than the previous year alone (Column 1). This accounts for the (rare) possibility
that during a particular year, a runner with Top 100 potential may have failed to finish a
race within the top twenty. Second, we restrict our definition of expected opposition by
counting only those East-African opponents whose finishing time was amongst the Top 100
finishing times of the (previous) year (Column 2). Using performance in combination with
33Using past finishing times as a measure of expected opposition would not allow for such an instrument
and would add measurement error coming from factors such as weather conditions.
34A reduction in the number of East-Africans by one is equivalent to a five percentage point decrease
in expected opposition since the determination of Ajt−1 is based on the race’s top 20 finishers. Keeping
the likelihood of participation constant, therefore, requires a reduction in the race’s average prize by
100, 000 · 0.05 · 0.0109
0.0211
= 2, 583 dollars.
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the runners’ origin allows us to capture the possibility that runners base their expectations
about opposition on the speed with which the race was run, while still allowing for a
decomposition of runners into two groups as outlined above.
In Table 5, we present the results with the interaction between opposition and prize-
concentration. Columns 1 to 4 show that there exists a differential effect of prize con-
centration on entry, depending on the expected level of opposition. In line with the
predictions of Proposition 1, we find that an increase in the prize structure’s concentra-
tion is associated with an increase in entry if and only if the level of opposition is below
a certain threshold. In particular, we find that an increase in the share awarded to the
winner makes a race more attractive when expected opposition (i.e., the proportion of
East-Africans among the race’s top twenty finishers in the previous year) is below 44%.35
For higher levels of expected opposition, prize concentration has a negative effect on the
entry of high-ability runners. This finding provides support for our assertion that, in
contests, selection effect can be opposed to incentive effects.
2.2.1 Exogenous variation in opposition
We have shown that participation is negatively related to expected opposition. An im-
portant concern, however, is that the main variable of interest, Ajt−1, might be correlated
with some unobservable characteristics, leading to a biased estimate of αA. If a race
becomes attractive to all high-ability runners, East-African and Non-East-African, for
reasons unexplained by our set of observables, it will create a positive correlation between
the entry of these runners and the error term. This would translate into an upward-biased
estimate of αA. To deal with this issue, we instrument for expected opposition, Ajt−1,
using exogenous variation in the entry of East-African runners, that is uncorrelated with
the (unobservable) race characteristics. We do this by instrumenting Ajt−1 with rainfall,
as well as commodity prices, in Kenya and Ethiopia in the previous year, t− 1, including
all the second stage controls and time trends. We then construct the interaction of the
predicted Ajt−1 with prize structure concentration. Both rainfall and commodity prices
are correlated with the number of East-African runners who compete in a given year but
uncorrelated with race characteristics. It is unlikely that these correlations will affect the
race choice of Non-East-Africans, except through the effect that they have on the level of
expected opposition, Ajt−1.
The reasoning behind the two instruments follows a growing literature, mainly in
35To determine this threshold we divide the concentration coefficient in Column 4 by the interaction
term to get 0.0117/0.0264=0.44.
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political economy, which relates rainfall and commodity prices to economic conditions in
Sub-Saharan countries. It has been shown that rainfall levels positively affect income per
capita (Miguel et al., 2004) and the functioning of democratic institutions (Bru¨ckner and
Ciccone, 2011) in Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, Deaton (1999) documents
that commodity price downturns cause rapidly worsening economic conditions in Sub-
Saharan African economies. Therefore, we expect rainfall and commodity prices to have
a positive effect on the international marathon participation of East-African runners. This
is intuitive since most East-African runners rely on the support of sponsors, some of which
are local businesses or regional government agencies.36
We construct international commodity price indices for Kenya and Ethiopia following
Deaton (1999) and Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2011). For this purpose, we use the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund monthly price data for exported commodities for the period 1986
to 2009 and the countries’ export shares of these commodities taken from Deaton for
1990. The rainfall data, covering the period 1986 to 2009, are taken from the NASA
Global Precipitation Climatology Project. The first-stage estimates show that rainfall
and commodity prices are, indeed, strongly related to the participation of East-African
runners in international marathons. In particular, with the exception of commodity prices
in Ethiopia, positive rainfall shocks and commodity price upturns, increase the number
of East-African runners competing internationally. The instruments are individually and
jointly significant in the first stage (the F-Statistic of their joint significance is 12.22).
The first-stage regression is reported in Table 11.
In Table 5, Columns 5 and 6, we present the results for the IV estimates including a
time trend and year dummies, respectively. Since the predicted Ajt−1 only varies at an
annual frequency we cannot estimate the level effect of expected opposition in Column 6.
We therefore focus on the interaction of the instrumented expected opposition with prize
structure concentration.
As in the OLS regressions, we find that the effect of concentration on entry depends
on the level of (expected) opposition. As opposition increases, prize concentration be-
comes less attractive. The results are in line with those found using OLS; however, the
magnitudes are larger, suggesting that the coefficient on expected opposition is, indeed,
biased upwards when using OLS. Separating by gender (Columns 7 and 8), the interaction
between expected opposition and prize steepness is slightly stronger for men, but overall
36We might be concerned that in years when there are more (fewer) East-African runners, the quality
of the marginal runner is lower (higher). We check this by looking at the finishing times of East-African
runners in the years when there are many (few) and find that these times are not statistically different
from one another.
we observe a similar pattern.
2.3 Sorting
While Proposition 1 was concerned with the contestants’ individual preferences, Propo-
sition 2 focuses on the equilibrium distribution of players across contests. We now move
from the determinants of individual race choice to the analysis of the aggregate distribu-
tion of runners across races, using the time-series variation of our dataset.
To test Proposition 2, we analyze whether an increase in the overall number of high-
ability contestants leads to a more balanced distribution of talent across contests. More
specifically, we test the following equation:
SMt = α0 + αHAHAt + αBB
M
t + t+ εt. (9)
The dependent variable, SMt , measures the level of sorting. It denotes the proportion of
East-African runners who choose to participate in a Major rather than a Minor marathon
in period t. For SMt = 1, sorting is complete–i.e., East-African runners participate exclu-
sively in Major marathons. The main variable of interest, HAt, is the overall proportion
of East-African runners, in period t. According to Proposition 2, sorting should be de-
creasing in HAt. The variable B
M
t denotes the proportion of the total prize money that is
awarded in the Major marathons. According to Proposition 2, sorting should be increas-
ing in BMt . We control for both time trends and for whether the year was an Olympic
year. Since marathons can be divided into spring and autumn races, and runners typically
choose one from each group, we consider contest choice for a given gender category, per
season rather than per year to allow for a richer analysis.
Table 6 shows the estimates for equation (9). Since, in our theoretical model, the
number of high-type contests is identical to the number of low-type contests, we first
restrict our analysis (Columns 1 to 4) to the top ten races. These races include the five
Major marathons, as well as the next five most important races (Hamburg, Honolulu,
Frankfurt, Paris, and Rome). In Columns 5 to 8, we consider the runners’ allocation
across all 35 races. The results are similar for both samples.
We find that an increase in the proportion of high-ability contestants leads to a sig-
nificant decrease in sorting. More specifically, as the proportion of East-African runners
in the top ten races increases by one percent, the share of East-Africans who choose a
Major marathon decreases by 0.77 percent without controlling for time trends and 1.28
percent when controlling for time trends. The effect is comparable, when all 35 races are
considered. These results constitute evidence for the decrease in sorting, as predicted by
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Proposition 2. As expected, we also find evidence for a positive relation between sorting
and prize budget differences. In particular, a one-percent increase in the proportion of
prize money awarded by the Major races leads to an increase in the share of East-African
runners entering a Major race by 1.22 percent for the top ten races and by 0.49 percent
for all 35 races. It is reassuring that these effects persist when we control for time trends,
gender and differential trends across gender.
We see that in an Olympic year, the proportion of East-African runners entering a
Major marathon increases by ten percent. This is intuitive since participation in the
Olympics is restricted by country quotas. Due to the large number of talented Kenyan
and Ethiopian runners, many of them are unable to run the Olympic marathon, whereas
runners of comparable ability but different nationality are able to participate with a higher
probability. As a result, the proportion of East-African runners in the Major races, the
next-best alternative to the Olympics, is higher in Olympic years.
To understand better the time series behavior of the main variables of interest, in
Figure 2 we plot the relationship between sorting (SMt ) and the overall proportion of
East-African runners (HAt) in each period. It seems that, while the proportion of East-
African runners has been increasing over time, sorting has been decreasing. To ensure
that our results are not driven by trends, we have always included time trends in all our
regressions. In Figure 3, we plot the de-trended variables. From the figure, we see that
the deviations from the trend of both variables also exhibit a negative relationship. This
variation is the one that identifies our main specification. Moreover, as robustness checks,
we now also estimate equation (9) with a quadratic and a cubic time trend function. In
Column 2 of Table 7, we show that controlling for more flexible time trends the main
results still hold.
To determine whether our results are identified by some time periods more than others,
in Column 3 of Table 7, we interact the main variable of interest, the fraction of high
ability runners, with time dummies for time periods 1986-1991, 1992-1997, 1998-2003,
and 2004-2009. The results show that the effect is identified across all periods, except the
first period, where, although the point estimate is highly negative, the standard errors
are quite large. Overall, our result that sorting depends negatively on the fraction of high
ability runners is consistent over time.
An alternative explanation for the decrease in sorting could be that organizers of
Major marathons restrict the number of East-African participants in order to guarantee a
diversified field. In order to rule this out, we check the robustness of our results using an
alternative proxy for talent. Rather than using origin, we identify a group of high-ability
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runners in a given season using performances.37 We identify high-ability runners as those
who have (adjusted) finishing times within one percent of the season’s fastest finishing
time in their gender category. We also look at those finishing within five and ten percent
of the fastest time, respectively. It is likely that the changes in the overall number of high-
ability runners over the years are, at least in part, a result of the increase in East-African
participation. However, this measure of high-ability is less restrictive, especially if the
quality and composition of the group of East-African runners are changing over time.
Table 8 shows that our main results still hold when we repeat the analysis for the
alternative measure of ability based on rankings. The sorting of high-ability runners into
Major races is increasing in the proportion of prize money on offer but decreasing in
the overall proportion of high-ability runners. Interestingly, the decrease is stronger the
more able the runners under consideration. In particular, a ten-percent increase in the
proportion of high-ability runners reduces sorting by 46, seven, or three percent when high-
ability refers to runners within one, five, or ten percent of the fastest time, respectively.
Thus, it seems as if a contestant’s tendency to avoid competition by equally talented
opponents is increasing in his ability. Finally, note that in contrast to our estimation
based on runners’ origin, the Olympic year dummy is no longer significant, which is in
line with the reasoning provided above.
2.4 Robustness
In this section, we address four relevant concerns: 1) the importance of prize-money for
a runner’s race choice; 2) the possibility of coordination; 3) the potential endogeneity of
prize budgets; and 4) the identification of Major races as high-type contests.
2.4.1 Do runners choose races based on prizes?
Based on runner-race characteristics (finishing times, prizes), how important are (ex-
pected) prize winnings in a runner’s race choice? For example, a runner’s race choice
might be driven by other (unobservable) factors, such as sponsors’ preferences. This issue
is crucial for determining whether our empirical setting is appropriate to test our model.
As an illustration, we use the most recent year of our data to investigate a runner’s
potential prize winnings, taking the behavior of all other runners as given. We then
construct the counterfactual outcome by counting the number of races in which the runner
37Note that, since effort and ability are hard to separate, finishing times may be related to prize money.
An advantage of using origin is, therefore, that this definition of high-ability is independent of prize money
considerations.
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could have obtained a higher prize than in the one he actually chose to compete in. We
take as given his current time (effort), as well as the times of all other runners, thus
neglecting potential effort adjustments.
We find that a surprisingly high fraction of runners choose a race that maximizes
their prize winnings ex post. In particular, around 40 percent of the prize winners could
not have earned a higher prize in any other marathon. A further 20 percent had only
one alternative race in which their prize would have been higher. This suggests that
(expected) prize winnings are an important determinant of runners’ behavior, relegating
other factors as major drivers of contest choice.
2.4.2 Coordinated race choices
In some instances runners are managed by athlete representatives. This may lead to
the race choices of runners, who are managed by a common representative, to become
coordinated. Our theory (Proposition 3) shows that such coordination would have a
negative effect on sorting. Hence coordination may confound our result that sorting
depends negatively on the number of high-ability contestants but only if coordination
was easier to achieve in larger groups, which seems unlikely to be the case. In fact,
coordination is commonly seen as a small-group phenomenon due to the relative ease
to agree on a common decision. If anything, we, therefore, underestimate the actual
reduction in sorting implied by an increase in the number of high-ability contestants.
Moreover, with respect to marathon running, we expect the effect of coordination on
contest choices to be small. Using affiliation data by Road Race Management Inc. (2015),
we find that the number of runners who share a common manager is relatively low with
respect to the overall number of runners. Based on the information available for the
1081 (male) East-African runners that year, we find that more than half of the runners
have no manager. For those who are represented by a manager (46%), the Herfindhal
concentration index calculated for the distribution of runners across managers is only 0.04.
This number increases only slightly to 0.10 when we restrict attention to the East-African
runners included in the IAAF Top 100 List. In particular, those runners are managed by
sixteen different representatives with at most nine runners sharing a common manager.
Hence, while athlete representatives may have some influence on race choices, the low
level of runners’ concentration suggests that their effect is rather small.
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2.4.3 Exogenous variation in prize budgets
We may be concerned that race organizers adjust their prizes to keep their race attractive
to high-ability contestants. If entry falls, race organizers may increase prize money. As
a consequence, the coefficient on Bjt in equation (8) would be biased downwards. We
deal with this problem by instrumenting the value of a race’s average prize with the
exchange rate of the country where the race takes place, relative to a currency basket.38
We expect that a move in the exchange rate is associated with an exogenous change in
the value of the race’s average prize. This change should not be associated directly with
race entry. In order to construct a currency basket, we use the annual Special Drawing
Rights basket provided by the International Monetary Fund.39 Table 9 shows that when
we instrument for the prize budget, the coefficient is positive and significant, as previously
seen. However, compared with OLS, the coefficient is larger, even after controlling for
race and year fixed-effects, suggesting that the OLS is, indeed, downward-biased. The
first stage of the instrument is reported in Table 11.
2.4.4 Identification of high-type contests
In our analysis of sorting in Section 2.3, we identify the Major races as the high-type
contests–i.e., as those with high prizes and high concentration. We verify our identifica-
tion by repeating the participation analysis in Section 2.2 through making a distinction
between entry into Major and Minor races. We define the variable Major, which takes
the value 1 if the race is a Major race and 0 otherwise, and we use it as an alternative
to the winner’s share to measure the prize structure’s concentration. We find that our
main results from Section 2.2 hold. Being a Major race increases entry, but as opposition
increases, Major races become less attractive to enter. This provides additional support
for our identification of Major races as high-type contests. The results are presented in
Table 10.
3 Conclusion
While the incentive effects of rewarding relative performance have been extensively studied
in the theoretical and empirical literature, little is known about contest selection. In this
38This is preferable over instrumenting with the value of an East-African runner’s national currency
since changes in the latter affect the attractiveness of all marathons equally.
39This basket contains U.S. Dollars, Euros, Japanese Yen, and Pounds Sterling. Weights assigned to
each currency are adjusted annually to take account of changes in the share of each currency in world
exports and international reserves.
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paper, we have presented and tested a simple model that studies both contest and effort
choices. Contestants take into account their own ability, the (expected) strength of their
competitors, and the reward schemes offered by the different types of contests. We show
that contrary to common belief, the contests with the highest and most-concentrated
prizes do not always attract the largest number of high-ability contestants. Contest
selection depends, in a systematic way, on the overall distribution of talent, and sorting
is reversed when the proportion of high-ability individuals increases beyond a certain
threshold. We show that the selection and incentive effects of a contest’s prize structure
can be either aligned or opposed depending on the competitiveness of the environment,
highlighting the importance to study both effects.
Data limitations often prevent the empirical study of contest theory. Key model
parameters, such as individual ability and performance, are often unobservable. Moreover,
in many tournament settings, a wide array of factors confound the variables of interest. In
a labor-market setting, for example, it is often difficult to separate worker from firm types.
Our real-effort tournament setting overcomes such identification problems and allows us
to shed light on important aspects of contest design. Detailed data on marathons and
professional road runners, spanning three decades, have provided us with an opportunity
to empirically test theoretical predictions on contest selection.
Our empirical findings confirm our theoretical results and provide evidence for the
contestants’ trade-off between entering a contest with few high prizes or a contest with
many low-prizes. Empirically, we have determined the “prize” that contestants are willing
to pay to avoid talented opponents and that organizers must offer to guarantee their
contest’s attractiveness. Using exogenous variation in the level of competition, our results
provide evidence for a strong negative relation between the level of sorting and the overall
frequency of highly-talented contestants.
This paper sheds light on an aspect of contest design that has been largely overlooked.
By focusing on the effect of contest design on participation, we have been able to es-
tablish results, both theoretically and empirically, that complement those in the existing
literature. Since the basic trade-off between prizes and opposition, which determines con-
test selection in our framework, is present in other settings, including labor tournaments,
procurement contests, and R&D competition, we expect our results to have important
implications for contest design in a broad variety of contexts.
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Figure 1: Competitiveness of Marathon Running.
Notes. Competitiveness is defined as the ratio of the fastest (male) winning time of a year
over the average finishing times of the top 20 (male) finishers in all races. Finishing times are
adjusted for racecourse differences.
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Figure 2: Sorting of High-Ability Runners.
Notes. Time-series plot of the overall proportion of high-ability runners (“Proportion of HA
(Origin)”) and the fraction who chose to participate in a Major rather than a Minor marathon
(“Sorting”).
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Figure 3: Sorting of High-Ability Runners (De-trended).
Notes. De-trended time-series plot of the overall proportion of high-ability runners (“Proportion
of HA (Origin)”) and the fraction who chose to participate in a Major rather than a Minor
marathon (“Sorting”). The variables are de-trended by linear trend.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Races)
Major Races All other Races
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Average Prize ($) 238 17,277 9,372 1381 3,240 4,331
1st/Total 238 0.34 0.12 1381 0.27 0.27
High Concentration 238 0.57 0.5 1381 0.35 0.48
No. of Participants 236 22,332 10,143 859 6,838 6,462
Winning Time (hh:min) 238 02:17 00:09 1381 02:25 00:13
High Ability (Origin) 238 0.18 0.18 1381 0.14 0.22
High Ability (1%) 238 0.03 0.06 1381 0.00 0.02
High Ability (5%) 238 0.29 0.26 1381 0.08 0.17
High Ability (10%) 238 0.66 0.29 1381 0.36 0.36
Notes. Means and standard deviations for Major and Minor marathons, respectively. Major
races are the Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, and New York marathons. The sample period
is 1986 to 2009. “Average Prize” is the sum of all prizes awarded in a race (US dollars at 2000
prices) divided by the number of prize winners. “1st/Total” is the winner’s prize divided by
the sum of all prizes in a race. “High Concentration” takes value 1 if the Herfindahl index,
calculated for the top three prizes, is above its mean value. “No. of Participants” is the total
number of participants, including amateurs, in a race. These data were collected separately
from various sources, including ARRS and race websites. “Winning Time” is adjusted using
ARRS conversion factors to ensure that times are comparable across races. “High Ability
(Origin)” refers to the fraction of runners from East Africa among the first 20 finishers of a
race. Similarly, “High Ability (1%) (5%), (10%)” refers to the fraction of runners among the
first 20 finishers of a race, finishing within 1%, 5%, and 10% of the best time of the year,
respectively.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Runners)
Male Runners
East-African Top 100 Non-East-African All others
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 2892 28.78 4.54 2684 30.05 4.14 4619 30.96 5.16
Prize ($) 2892 7,676 17,780 2684 8,284 16,048 4619 833 2,075
No. Races 2892 1.42 0.6 2684 1.44 0.61 4619 1.17 0.45
Fraction entering Major Race 2892 0.23 0.42 2684 0.38 0.49 4619 0.14 0.34
Finish Time 2892 2:14 0:05 2684 2:12 0:02 4619 2:20 0:05
Female Runners
East-African Top 100 Non-East-African All others
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 646 27.69 4.44 2621 30.82 5.35 4840 32.26 6.31
Prize ($) 646 12,420 25,536 2621 10,339 18,319 4840 815 1,885
No. Races 646 1.45 0.59 2621 1.54 0.72 4840 1.19 0.46
Fraction entering Major Race 646 0.32 0.47 2621 0.43 0.49 4840 0.19 0.39
Finish Time 646 2:33 0:08 2621 2:32 0:04 4840 2:46 0:07
Notes. Means and standard deviations (by gender category) for East-African runners, Top 100 Non-East-African runners, and all other
runners, respectively. The sample period is 1986 to 2009. “No. of Races” is the number of races run in a given year. “Prize” is the
prize money in US dollars at 2000 prices that a runner wins (on average) per race. “Finishing Times” have been adjusted using ARRS
conversion factors to ensure that race courses are comparable.
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Table 3: Probability of Entering a Race (OLS).
OLS OLS OLS OLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables enter enter enter enter
Expected Oppositiont−1 -0.0271*** -0.0250*** -0.0162*** -0.0109***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Average Prize (’00000) 0.3381*** 0.3404*** 0.3197*** 0.0211*
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012]
1st/Total -0.0259*** -0.0271*** -0.0108*** 0.0086***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Female -0.0013 0.0033* 0.0032
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Age -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.1164*** 0.1200*** 0.1223***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.002]
Nationality: US 0.0070*** 0.0063*** 0.0065***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Rankt−1 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant 0.0312*** 0.0281*** 0.0261*** 0.0215***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005]
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Race Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 144,880 144,120 144,120 144,120
R-Squared 0.015 0.036 0.041 0.059
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard
errors are clustered at the runner-year level. The sample is restricted to the runners who were
among the Top 100 Non-East-African runners in the previous year. The sample period is 1986
to 2009. “Expected Opposition (t-1)” is the fraction of East-African runners among the top
20 finishers of the race in the previous year. “Average Prize” is the sum of all prizes awarded
in the race (US dollars at 2000 prices) divided by the number of prize winners. “1st/Total” is
the winner’s prize divided by the sum of all prizes in the race. “At home‘” takes the value 1 if
the runner is racing in his or her home country. “Nationality” takes the value 1 if the runner
is from the US and 0 otherwise. “Rank (t-1)” is the ranking of the runner in the previous year
(between 1 and 100). The time fixed-effects include a complete set of month and year dummies,
as well as year and gender interactions.
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Table 4: Probability of Entering a Race (Robustness).
OLS OLS
[1] [2]
Variables enter enter
Expected Oppositiont−1 -0.0114*** -0.0147***
[0.004] [0.004]
Average Prize (’00000) 0.0199 0.0235**
[0.019] [0.012]
1st/Total 0.0092*** 0.0083***
[0.002] [0.003]
Female 0.0027 0.0011
[0.002] [0.001]
Age -0.0000** -0.0000**
[0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.1204*** 0.1217***
[0.005] [0.002]
Nationality US 0.0058*** 0.0063***
[0.001] [0.002]
Rankt−1 -0.0000*** -0.0001***
[0.000] [0.000]
Constant -0.0087*** 0.0345***
[0.003] [0.004]
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Race Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 168,461 144,120
R-Squared 0.054 0.058
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard
errors are clustered at the runner-year level. In Column 1 the sample is extended to include
the race choices of those runners who were among the Top 100 Non-East-African runners in
any of the previous three years. In Column 2 the definition of “Expected Opposition (t-1)”
is narrowed to include only those East-African participants of the previous year’s race whose
performance was within the Top 100 finishing times of that year. All other variables are as
described previously in Table 3.
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Table 5: Probability of Entering a Race (Instrument for Expected Opposition).
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Variables enter enter enter enter enter enter enter enter
Exp.Oppositiont−1 0.0003 0.0061 0.0084* -0.0031 -0.0391
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.024]
Av. Prize (’00000) 0.3462*** 0.3264*** 0.3273*** 0.0272** 0.0364** 0.0387*** 0.0146 0.0374*
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.016] [0.013] [0.017] [0.020]
1st/Total -0.0158*** -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0117*** 0.0144*** 0.0166*** 0.0232*** 0.0126***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004]
Exp.Opp.t−1*1st/Total -0.0927*** -0.0853*** -0.0849*** -0.0264** -0.0582*** -0.0551***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015]
Female -0.0009 0.0013 0.0027 -0.0067* 0.0036* -0.0598*** -0.0494**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.021] [0.023]
Age 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.1192*** 0.1196*** 0.1222*** 0.1225*** 0.1222*** 0.1446*** 0.1012***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Nationality: US 0.0062*** 0.0063*** 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 0.0070** 0.0053
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Rankt−1 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Trend 0.0007*
[0.000]
Constant 0.0284*** 0.0221*** 0.0246*** 0.0211*** -0.0043 0.0211*** 0.0042 0.0379***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Race Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144,880 144,120 144,120 144,120 144,120 144,120 75,369 68,751
R-squared 0.016 0.042 0.042 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.065 0.056
P-Val. F-test exc. ins. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the runner-year level and bootstrapped
with 200 replications in the IV regressions. Expected opposition is instrumented with the commodity price index and (log) rainfall in Kenya and Ethiopia
in the previous year. Separate regressions for men and women are shown in Column 7 and 8 respectively. See Table 3 for other definitions.
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Table 6: Sorting of High-Ability Runners (Origin).
Top 10 Races All 35 Races
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Variables Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting
Proportion of HA (Origin) -0.7742*** -0.3551** -1.0272** -1.2758** -0.6222*** -0.5091*** -1.4293*** -1.5077***
[0.187] [0.171] [0.501] [0.494] [0.146] [0.151] [0.409] [0.390]
Proportion of Prize 1.1128*** 1.1749*** 1.2193*** 0.4795*** 0.4640*** 0.4907***
[0.190] [0.195] [0.189] [0.124] [0.119] [0.126]
Female -0.0894* -0.0734* -0.2516 -0.2575* -0.0224 -0.039 -0.0208 -0.0354
[0.050] [0.042] [0.153] [0.148] [0.040] [0.040] [0.168] [0.174]
Trend 0.0125 0.02 0.0301* 0.0320**
[0.017] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Trend*Female 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0102 -0.0105
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Olympic Year 0.0967** 0.0548*
[0.039] [0.030]
Constant 0.8727*** -0.2134 -0.1688 -0.2579 0.4689*** 0.1342 -0.0132 -0.0408
[0.097] [0.202] [0.280] [0.273] [0.081] [0.122] [0.183] [0.185]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.19 0.448 0.471 0.513 0.274 0.381 0.419 0.445
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. High-ability runners are defined as those who originate from Kenya or
Ethiopia. Top 10 Races include the Major races (Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, and New York), as well as Hamburg, Honolulu, Frankfurt, Paris,
Rome. The dependent variable, “Sorting”, is the proportion of high-ability runners who enter a Major rather than a Minor race. “Proportion of HA” is
the overall proportion of high-ability runners in the population of runners. Both variables are calculated separately for each race season (spring, autumn).
“Proportion of Prize” is the proportion of the overall prize money awarded in the Major races. “Trend” is a linear trend for the sample period 1986 to
2009. “Olympic Year” takes value 1 in years 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 and 0 in all other years.
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Table 7: Sorting of High-Ability Runners (Flexible Time Trends).
[1] [2] [3]
Variables Sorting Sorting Sorting
Proportion of HA (Origin) -1.5077*** -1.2337***
[0.390] [0.335]
Proportion of HA*8691 -1.2782
[1.485]
Proportion of HA*9297 -1.2646**
[0.522]
Proportion of HA*9803 -1.2311***
[0.349]
Proportion of HA*0409 -1.0226***
[0.322]
Trend 0.0320** 0.1272* 0.0416
[0.015] [0.069] [0.112]
Trend Sq. -0.0058 -0.0014
[0.004] [0.006]
Trend Cub. 0.0001 0.0001
[0.000] [0.000]
Proportion of Prize 0.4907*** 0.5285*** 0.5247***
[0.126] [0.127] [0.121]
Female -0.0354 -0.1574 -0.1958
[0.174] [0.187] [0.239]
Trend*Female -0.0105 -0.0025 0.0005
[0.008] [0.007] [0.009]
Olympic Year 0.0548* 0.0530* 0.0391
[0.030] [0.030] [0.027]
Constant -0.0408 -0.5 0.046
[0.185] [0.425] [0.638]
Observations 79 79 79
R-squared 0.445 0.49 0.546
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The table
shows sorting of high ability runners (origin) across all 35 races.“Trend” is a linear trend for
the sample period 1986-2009. “Trend Sq.” and “Trend Cub.” are the trend squared and trend
cubic, respectively. In Column 3, the proportion of high ability runners is interacted with
dummy variables indicating time periods 1986-1991, 1992-1997, 1998-2003, 2004-2009. The
regression considers sorting across all 35 races and definitions of all remaining variables are as
in Table 6.
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Table 8: Sorting of High-Ability Runners (Performance).
Top 10 Races All Races
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variables Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting
Proportion of HA (1%) -1.9589*** -4.6357**
[0.707] [2.148]
Proportion of HA (5%) -0.2751* -0.7163***
[0.159] [0.214]
Proportion of HA (10%) -0.1194 -0.3075***
[0.146] [0.110]
Proportion of Prize 0.3263* 1.0318*** 1.1413*** 1.2664*** 0.7091*** 0.4475***
[0.176] [0.126] [0.119] [0.286] [0.140] [0.082]
Female -0.1602 -0.0097 -0.0432 0.1364 -0.0995 -0.1608*
[0.128] [0.105] [0.122] [0.221] [0.112] [0.083]
Trend -0.0193** -0.0139** -0.0036 0.0171 -0.0170** -0.0166***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.007] [0.005]
Trend*Female 0.0102* 0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0086 0.0060 0.0063**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005] [0.003]
Olympic Year 0.0233 -0.0231 0.0071 -0.0634 -0.0008 0.0137
[0.035] [0.025] [0.023] [0.061] [0.028] [0.016]
Constant 1.0270*** 0.1000 -0.1355 -0.3148 0.4351* 0.5788**
[0.259] [0.242] [0.336] [0.380] [0.240] [0.220]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.314 0.719 0.692 0.364 0.603 0.622
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. High-ability runners are defined as
those with an (adjusted) finishing time within 1% (5%, 10%) of the race seasons’s fastest time in their gender category.
The dependent variable “Sorting” is the proportion of high-ability runners who enter a Major rather than a Minor race.
“Proportion of HA 1% (5%, 10%)”, is the overall proportion of high-ability runners in the population of runners. Both
variables are calculated separately for each race season (spring, autumn). For definition of other variables, see Table 6.
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Table 9: Probability of Entering a Race (Instrument for Prizes).
IV IV
[1] [2]
Variables enter enter
Expected Oppositiont−1 -0.0124*** 0.011
[0.004] [0.009]
Average Prize (’00000) 0.3499** 0.3257**
[0.168] [0.160]
1st/Total -0.0172 -0.0049
[0.013] [0.009]
Exp.Opp.t−1*1st/Total -0.0787***
[0.030]
Female 0.0060** 0.004
[0.003] [0.002]
Age 0 0
[0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.1220*** 0.1219***
[0.002] [0.002]
Nationality: US -0.0001*** -0.0001***
[0.000] [0.000]
Rankt−1 0.0064*** 0.0064***
[0.002] [0.002]
Constant 0.0247*** 0.0230***
[0.005] [0.005]
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Race Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 144,120 144,120
R-squared 0.053 0.055
P-Value of F-test of exc. ins. 0.0000 0.0000
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard
errors are clustered at the runner-year level. Average Prize is instrumented with the exchange
rate of the country of the race relative to the Special Drawing Rights currency basket provided
by the IMF. For definition of variables, see Table 3.
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Table 10: Probability of Entering a Race (Major Race as Indicator for High Concentration ).
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Variables enter enter enter enter enter enter enter
Expected Oppositiont−1 -0.0156*** -0.0137*** -0.0204*** -0.0048** -0.0048* -0.0126***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
Average Prize (’00000) 0.1092*** 0.1109*** 0.1069*** 0.1542*** 0.1562*** 0.1527*** 0.1872***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.011]
Major Race 0.0633*** 0.0630*** 0.0639*** 0.0819*** 0.0812*** 0.0787*** 0.0851***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002]
Exp. Opp.t−1*Major Race -0.1401*** -0.1376*** -0.1238*** -0.1863***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.010]
Female -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0031*** -0.0026 0.0024
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Age 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.1155*** 0.1193*** 0.1152*** 0.1190*** 0.1187***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002]
Nationality: US 0.0065*** 0.0063*** 0.0065*** 0.0063*** 0.0060**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Rankt−1 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant 0.0252*** 0.0219*** 0.0232*** 0.0221*** 0.0200*** 0.0200*** 0.0229***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005]
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 144,880 144,120 144,120 144,880 144,120 144,120 144,120
R-squared 0.022 0.043 0.047 0.024 0.045 0.049 0.049
P-Value of F-test of exc. ins. 0.0000
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the runner-year level.
“Major Race” takes value 1 if the race is a Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, or New York marathon. Expected opposition is instrumented
with the commodity price index in Kenya and Ethiopia in the previous year, as well as the (log) rainfall in Kenya and Ethiopia in the previous
year. For definition of variables, see Table 3.
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Table 11: First Stage Regressions.
Exp. Oppositiont−1 Exp. Oppositiont−1 Average Prize (’00000)
Variables (for Table 5) (for Table 10) (for Table 9)
Commodity Price Index in Kenyat−1 0.0021*** 0.0003***
[0.000] [0.000]
Log Rainfall in Kenyat−1 0.1833*** 0.0193***
[0.005] [0.005]
Commodity Price Index in Ethiopiat−1 -0.001*** -0.002***
[0.000] [0.000]
Log Rainfall in Ethiopiat−1 0.0115*** 0.0201***
[0.003] [0.003]
Exchange Rate 0.0001***
[0.000]
Constant -0.6411*** -0.1305*** -0.0369**
[0.0184] [0.0165] [0.0039]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes
Race Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144,120 144,120 144,120
R-Squared 0.49 0.61 0.743
Notes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the runner-
year level. “Commodity Price Index Kenya (Ethiopia) in t-1” is constructed using the international commodity price data from
International Monetary Fund. “Log Rainfall in Kenya (Ethiopia) in t-1” is annual rainfall data from the NASA Global Precipitation
Climatology Project. “Exchange Rate” is the exchange rate of the country of the race relative to the Special Drawing Rights
currency basket provided by the International Monetary Fund.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a contest withMj prizes of size bj that has attracted NH high-ability participants
and N +1−NH low-ability participants. Index the N +1 participants of the contest in a
way such that players n ∈ {1, . . . , NH} are of type H and players n ∈ {NH+1, . . . , N+1}
are of type L. Our model satisfies the definition of a (separable) all-pay contest in Siegel
(2009) with a player n’s valuation for winning given by vn = bj − cne where cn = cH for
n ∈ {1, . . . , NH} and cn = cL for n ∈ {NH + 1, . . . , N + 1}.
In order to satisfy Siegel’s conditions for a generic contest, we now perturb the model
by assuming that player n’s (perturbed) valuation of winning is given by v˜n = vn − nǫ
with ǫ ∈ (0,
bj
N+1
). This can be motivated by the existence of (small) differences in the
players’ benefits from obtaining one of the contest’s prizes. Theorem 1 of Siegel (2009)
then implies that, in any equilibrium, the expected payoff of player n is given by
max{0, bj − nǫ−
cn
cMj+1
[bj − (Mj + 1)ǫ]}. (10)
Note that expected payoffs are zero for all players n ∈ {Mj + 1, . . . , N + 1}. Also note
that for NH ≥Mj +1, all players n ∈ {1, . . . ,Mj +1} have marginal cost cn = cH , which
implies that the expected payoff of player n ∈ {1, . . . ,Mj} is given by (Mj + 1 − n)ǫ.
Finally, for NH < Mj + 1, it holds that cMj+1 = cL. In this case, the expected payoff
of player n ∈ {1, . . . , NH} is given by bj − nǫ −
cH
cL
[bj − (Mj + 1)ǫ] whereas the expected
payoff of player n ∈ {NH + 1, . . . ,Mj} is (Mj + 1− n)ǫ. Taking the limit ǫ→ 0 leads to
the payoffs described in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
To abbreviate notation in this and in most of the subsequent proofs, we suppress the
number of opponents N as an argument in the (cumulative) distribution functions defined
in (2) by letting f(k; p) ≡ f(k;N, p) and F (k; p) ≡ F (K;N, p).
It is immediate that E[UH ] is increasing in bj and Mj , but decreasing in pj. To prove
the last claim of Proposition 1, increase the concentration of the contest’s prize structure
by letting M˜j < Mj and b˜j > bj , and consider
E[UH ]− ˜E[UH ]
1− c
= bjF (Mj − 1; pj)− b˜jF (M˜j − 1; pj) (11)
= bj [F (Mj − 1; pj)− F (M˜j − 1; pj)]− (b˜j − bj)F (M˜j − 1; pj).
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The first term represents the advantage of the less-concentrated prize structure. When
the number of high-ability opponents turns out to be between M˜j and Mj − 1, the less-
concentrated prize structure guarantees a positive payoff, bj , whereas payoffs are zero
for the more-concentrated prize structure. The second term represents the advantage of
the more-concentrated prize structure. When the number of high-ability opponents is
smaller or equal to M˜j − 1, payoffs are positive for both prize structures, but the more-
concentrated prize structure offers an extra payoff b˜j − bj > 0. Now E[UH ]− ˜E[UH ] ≥ 0
is equivalent to
bj
b˜j − bj
≥
[
F (Mj − 1; pj)
F (M˜j − 1; pj)
− 1
]−1
. (12)
We show below that the likelihood ratio
F (Mj−1;pj)
F (M˜j−1;pj)
is strictly increasing in pj, tends to
infinity for pj → 1, and converges to 1 for pj → 0. Hence, there exists a p¯j ∈ (0, 1) such
that E[UH ] − ˜E[UH ] ≥ 0 if and only if pj > p¯j . The more-concentrated prize structure
(M˜j , b˜j) guarantees a higher payoff if and only if the likelihood pj with which opponents
have high ability is smaller than p¯j. The threshold p¯j is decreasing in Mj − M˜j and
increasing in
b˜j
bj
. To complete the proof, consider
∂F (K; p)
∂p
=
K∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
[kpk−1(1− p)N−k − (N − k)pk(1− p)N−k−1] (13)
=
1
p(1− p)
K∑
k=0
f(k; p)(k −Np)
=
F (K; p)
p(1− p)
{Ep[k|k ≤ K]− Ep[k]} < 0.
Here Ep[k] = Np denotes the expected number of successes under the binomial distri-
bution f(k; p) and Ep[k|k ≤ K] is the expected number of successes conditional on this
number being smaller or equal to K. Using (13) we obtain for K > K˜:
∂
∂p
[
F (K; p)
F (K˜; p)
]
=
F (K; p)
F (K˜; p)
Ep[k|k ≤ K]− Ep[k|k ≤ K˜]
p(1− p)
> 0. (14)
For p → 0 it holds that F (K; p) → 1 for all K implying that F (K;p)
F (K˜;p)
→ 1. Finally, using
l’Hopital’s theorem we obtain
lim
p→1
F (K; p)
F (K˜; p)
= lim
p→1
∂F (K;p)
∂p
∂F (K˜;p)
∂p
= lim
p→1
(N −K)
(
N
K
)
(N − K˜)
(
N
K˜
)( p
1− p
)K−K˜ =∞ (15)
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where we have used the representation of F in terms of the regularized incomplete beta
function
F (K; p) = (N −K)
(
N
K
)∫ 1−p
0
xN−K−1(1− x)Kdx (16)
to get
∂F (K; p)
∂p
= −(N −K)
(
N
K
)
(1− p)N−K−1pK . (17)
Proof of Proposition 2
The high-ability players’ preferences over contests are given by (4) with ph = 2yqH and
pl = 2y(1− qH). It follows from (13) that
d∆
dqH
= 2y
[
bh
dF (Mh − 1; ph)
dph
+ bl
dF (Ml − 1; pl)
dpl
]
< 0. (18)
The higher the fraction of high-ability players who choose high-type contests, the less
willing are high-ability players to enter such contests. The fact that bh > bl implies that
∆(qH = 0) = bh − blF (Ml − 1; 2y) > 0. (19)
Hence, there cannot exist an equilibrium in which q∗H = 0. Moreover,
∆(qH = 1) = bhF (Mh − 1; 2y)− bl. (20)
Note that ∆(qH = 1) is strictly decreasing in y with ∆(qH = 1)→ −bl < 0 for y →
1
2
and
∆(qH = 1) → bh − bl > 0 for y → 0. Hence, there exists a unique y¯ ∈ (0,
1
2
) such that
∆(qH = 1) ≥ 0 if and only if y ≤ y¯. Therefore, an equilibrium in which q
∗
H = 1 exists if
and only if y ≤ y¯. Moreover, the equation ∆(q∗H) = 0 has a solution q
∗
H ∈ (0, 1) if and
only if y > y¯. This solution and, hence, the equilibrium are unique. To determine how
q∗H depends on y for y > y¯, use (13) to get
y
d∆
dy
= bhph
dF (Mh − 1; ph)
dph
− blpl
dF (Ml − 1; pl)
dpl
(21)
=
bhF (Mh − 1; ph)
1− ph
{Eph[k|k ≤Mh − 1]− Eph[k]} (22)
−
blF (Ml − 1, pl)
1− pl
{Epl[k|k ≤Ml − 1]− Epl[k]}.
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For qH such that ∆ = 0, we can substitute bh = bl
F (Ml−1;pl)
F (Mh−1;ph)
to get
y d∆
dy
blF (Ml − 1; pl)
=
Eph[k|k ≤Mh − 1]− Eph[k]
1− ph
−
Epl[k|k ≤Ml − 1]−Epl [k]
1− pl
(23)
<
Eph[k|k ≤Ml − 1]− Eph[k]
1− ph
−
Epl[k|k ≤Ml − 1]− Epl[k]
1− pl
where the inequality follows from Mh < Ml. Note that
∂
∂p
Ep[k|k ≤ K]−Ep[k]
1− p
=
(1− p)∂Ep[k|k≤K]
∂p
+ Ep[k|k ≤ K]−N
(1− p)2
≤ 0 (24)
because Ep[k|k ≤ K] ≤ Ep[k] = pN and
∂Ep[k|k≤K]
∂p
≤ ∂Ep[k]
∂p
= N (see below).
In summary, since ph ≥ pl ⇔ qH ≥
1
2
, we have thus shown that at any equilibrium
such that q∗H ∈ [
1
2
, 1) it holds that d∆
dy
|qH=q∗H < 0. Together with
d∆
dqH
< 0, this implies that
q∗H is strictly decreasing in y as long as q
∗
H ∈ [
1
2
, 1). This also means that once q∗H has
crossed 1
2
from above, it will stay below 1
2
for all higher values of y. In other words, there
exists a y¯ ∈ (y¯, 1
2
] such that q∗H ≤
1
2
for all y ≥ y¯.
It remains to show that ∂Ep[k|k≤K]
∂p
≤ ∂Ep[k]
∂p
. Following Jones (1990), let k˜ be a so called
weighted random variable with distribution function f˜(k˜) ≡ k˜
Ep[k]
f(k˜; p,N). Let F˜ denote
the corresponding cumulative distribution function. Supressing p as an argument we can
write
E[k|k ≤ K] =
K∑
k=0
kf(k;N)
F (K;N)
=
E[k]
F (K;N)
K∑
k=0
kf(k;N)
E[k]
=
E[k]
F (K;N)
F˜ (K) (25)
and the result follows if F˜ (K)
F (K;N)
is decreasing in p. Note that f˜(0) = 0 and that for k˜ > 0:
f˜(k˜) =
k˜
Np
(
N
k˜
)
pk˜(1− p)N−k˜ =
(
N − 1
k˜ − 1
)
pk˜−1(1− p)N−1−(k˜−1). (26)
Hence F˜ (K) = F (K − 1;N − 1) and
∂
∂p
[
F˜ (K)
F (K;N)
]
=
F (K − 1;N − 1)
F (K;N)
EN−1[k|k ≤ K − 1]− EN [k|k ≤ K] + p
p(1− p)
(27)
where EN−1 and EN denote expectations for binomial distributions f(k; p,N − 1) and
f(k; p,N) respectively. To see that this term is negative, write k =
∑N
n=1 xn with xn,
n = 1, . . . , N , denoting N independent Bernoulli trials with success probability p and
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note that
EN [k|k ≤ K] = E[
N∑
n=1
xn|
N∑
n=1
xn ≤ K] > E[
N∑
n=1
xn|
N−1∑
n=1
xn ≤ K − 1 ∧ xN ≤ 1] (28)
= E[
N−1∑
n=1
xn|
N−1∑
n=1
xn ≤ K − 1] + E[xN |xN ≤ 1]
= EN−1[k|k ≤ K − 1] + p.
Here the inequality holds since
∑N
n=1 xn ≤ K is the union of two disjoint events:
∑N−1
n=1 xn =
K and xN = 0 or
∑N−1
n=1 xn ≤ K − 1 and xN ≤ 1 with the former dominating the latter
in terms of the expected value of
∑N
n=1 xn.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the concavity of the coordinator’s objective function:
∂∆C
∂qH
= 2
∂∆
∂qH
+ 2y
[
bhph
∂2F (Mh − 1; ph)
∂p2
+ blpl
∂2F (Ml − 1; pl)
∂p2
]
. (29)
Taking the derivative of (17) we get
∂2F (K; p)
∂p2
= (N −K)[(N − 1)p−K]
(
N
K
)
pK−1(1− p)N−K−2. (30)
Substituting (17) and (30) into (29) and using (N −M + 1)
(
N
M−1
)
=M
(
N
M
)
we get
∂∆C
∂qH
2y
= bhMh[Nph −Mh − (1− ph)]
(
N
Mh
)
pMh−1h (1− ph)
N−Mh−1 (31)
+blMl[Npl −Ml − (1− pl)]
(
N
Ml
)
pMl−1l (1− pl)
N−Ml−1.
If in both types of contests, the expected number of high-talent opponents is smaller than
the number of prizes, i.e. if Nph < Mh and Npl < Ml then
∂∆C
∂qH
< 0. Since ph and
pl are both smaller than 2y and Mh < Ml, a sufficient condition for the above to holds
is that 2yN < Mh or y <
Mh
2N
. This condition is sufficient for the manager’s objective
function to be concave and for a unique maximizer qCH to exist. In order to see how q
C
H
compares to q∗H , consider ∆C(q
∗
H). Given concavity of the manager’s objective, it holds
that qCH < q
∗
H ⇔ ∆C(q
∗
H) < 0. We have
∆C(q
∗
H) = 2yq
∗
Hbh
∂F (Mh − 1, 2yq
∗
H)
∂p
− 2y(1− q∗H)bl
∂F (Ml − 1, 2y(1− q
∗
H))
∂p
= y
∂∆
∂y
|qH=q∗H . (32)
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In the proof of Proposition 2 it was shown that this term is negative for all q∗H ≥
1
2
.
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